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MOTIVATED DOUBTS:
A COMMENT ON WALTON’S THEORY OF CRITICISM
Abstract. In his theory of criticism, D. N. Walton presupposes that an oppo-
nent either critically questions an argument, without supplementing this ques-
tioning with any reasoning of her own, or that she puts forward a critical ques-
tion and supplements it with a counterargument, that is, with reasoning in
defense of an opposite position of her own. In this paper, I show that there is
a kind of in-between critical option for the opponent that needs to be taken
into account in any classification of types of criticism, and that should not
be overlooked in a system of dialogue norms, nor in a procedure for develop-
ing a strategically expedient critique. In this third option, an opponent ques-
tions and overtly doubts a statement of the proponent and supplements her
doubts with a counterconsideration that explains and motivates her position of
critical doubt, yet without supporting any opposite thesis, thereby assisting,
as it were, the proponent in his attempt to develop a responsive argumenta-
tion, tailor-made to convince this particular opponent. First, I elaborate on
the notion of an explanatory counterconsideration. Second, I discuss Walton’s
distinction between premises that can be challenged by mere questioning (“or-
dinary premises” and “assumptions”) and premises that must be challenged by
incurring the obligation to offer counter-argumentation (somewhat confusingly
labeled “exceptions”). I contend that the latter type of premises, that I would
label “normality premises,” can be attacked without incurring a genuine burden
of proof. Instead, it can be attacked by means of incurring a burden of criti-
cism (Van Laar and Krabbe, 2013) that amounts to the obligation to offer an
explanatory counterconsideration, rather than a convincing ex concessis argu-
ment. Of course, providing the opponent with the right to discharge her burden
of criticism with explanatory counterconsiderations brings a clear strategic ad-
vantage to her. It is much less demanding to motivate one’s doubts regarding
proposition P, than to convince the proponent of not-P. If we want to encourage
opponents to act critically, and proponents to develop responsive arguments, the
importance of the notions of an explanatory counterconsideration and of a mo-
tivated doubt should be emphasized in the theory of criticism.
Keywords: burden of criticism, counterargument, criticism, exception, explana-
tory counterconsideration, D. N. Walton
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1. Introduction
Argumentation cannot be understood without having a clear grasp of
the nature of the criticism that it purports to respond to. And criticism
cannot be evaluated as legitimate or strategically expedient without having
appropriate norms for criticism at our disposal. The conceptual background
of the intricate links between argumentation and criticism has been de-
veloped in dialectical approaches to the subject, where argumentation is
dealt with as a co-production of a defending proponent and a critical op-
ponent. The proponent develops a (more or less) responsive defence of his
thesis against an opponent who critically tests the thesis and the subse-
quent arguments, in a shared attempt to resolve their difference on what
they perceive as the merits of both sides (cf. on critical discussion, Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004; and on persuasion dialogue, Walton and
Krabbe, 1995).
Walton’s article “How to Refute an Argument Using Artificial Intelli-
gence,” published in this journal (2011), contributes to the much-needed
theory of criticism (cf. Johnson, 2000; Govier, 1999; Krabbe, 2007: Krabbe
and Van Laar, 2011; Van Laar and Krabbe, 2013; Walton, 2012). Walton
deals with a large number of issues, three main ones of which are: (1) How
to distinguish and characterize types of criticism such as rebuttal, attack,
challenge, refutation, exception, defeater, and objection? (2) What norms
govern these types of criticism in dialogue? (3) With what procedure can
one develop a strategically expedient attack on an argument? In this dis-
cussion paper, I shall restrict my attention to a supposition that underlies
Walton’s ideas on what he calls premise attacks, and that has consequences
for his views on each of these three issues. According to this supposition,
an opponent either critically questions an argument, without supplementing
this questioning with any reasoning of her own, or she puts forward a critical
question and supplements it with a counterargument, that is, with reasoning
in defense of an opposite position of her own. The supposition becomes ap-
parent when Walton distinguishes between: (1) two kinds of premises, called
assumptions and exceptions, and the corresponding types of critical ques-
tions (sometimes also called assumptions and exceptions by Walton: 2011,
p. 137); (2) the norms that apply when an opponent chooses to criticize
assumptions and exceptions; and (3) between the ways they fit in expedient
strategies for attacking an argument. In this paper, however, I want to em-
phasize that there is a kind of in-between critical option for the opponent
that deserves to be taken into account in any classification of types of criti-
cism, and that should not be overlooked in a system of dialogue norms, nor
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in a procedure for developing a strategically expedient critique. In this third
option, an opponent questions and overtly doubts a statement of the propo-
nent and supplements her doubts with a counterconsideration that explains
and motivates her position of critical doubt, yet without supporting any
opposite thesis of her own, thereby assisting, as it were, the proponent in
his attempt to develop a responsive argumentation.
In Section 2, I shall elaborate on this notion of an explanatory counter-
consideration, and how it can be used to express motivated doubt. In Sec-
tion 3, I shall examine how this third option could be taken into account in
a computational approach to criticism.
2. Motivating doubts
In order to introduce the idea of an explanatory counterconsideration,
and to show how it can be used in an argumentative exchange to motivate
one’s doubt and thereby to substantiate one’s critical position yet without
really offering an argument, I shall consider the following variant of an
example used by Walton. Suppose that the proponent puts forward as his
thesis that video games lead to violence, and that the opponent addressed
challenges this by requesting for argumentation: “Why do you think so?
How can you convince me? What would be your argument?” Then, within
the normative framework of any argumentative exchange along the lines
of a persuasion dialogue or a critical discussion, it is on the proponent to
defend his thesis, and to discharge his burden of proof. But then, he may
not know in sufficient detail how to address the opponent, and what kind of
reason might turn out to be convincing to her. Thus, there is an incentive for
the proponent to request the opponent to inform him about what motivates
her doubt, so as to become clear about what kind of propositions would
take away her motivations for being critical.
For example, the proponent might want to know whether the opponent
is reluctant to accept his opinion for taking into account the possibility that
there is no causal link between playing video games and committing acts of
violence, yet without having any doubts about the existence of correlations
between playing these games and committing these acts. Or, alternatively,
whether the opponent is taking into account the possibility that there are
not even clear correlations between playing these games and committing
these acts. Each situation would require a different argumentative defence
on the proponent’s part, and so he might want to be informed about the
specific motivation that underlies the opponent’s criticism, so as to be able
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to maximize his chance of developing a responsive argument, tailor-made
to convince this particular opponent. In such a situation, the proponent
might want to pose a request for explanation: Instead of rushing into giving
an argument to discharge his burden of proof, the proponent first requests
a counterconsideration that would show what motivates the opponent to
doubt the thesis at issue: “Please, explain why you do not accept that video
games lead to violence” (See on such requests for explanation and the posi-
tive role they may play in persuasion dialogue: Van Laar and Krabbe, 2013).
The requested explanation can (but need not) be presented as a regu-
lar kind of assertion, which can be criticized in turn by the proponent if he
would want so. For example, the opponent might state: “Well, there are clear
correlations, but the causal connection cannot been made.” In that case, the
proponent should be allowed to force the opponent to become a second pro-
ponent, and to develop a convincing argument of her own.1 In other words,
the opponent’s explanation is wrapped up in a counterassertion, and the
proponent obtains the option to attack it, thus requesting a counterargu-
ment. The proponent’s request for a counterargument cannot be refused by
the opponent, on pains of committing the fallacy of Evading the Burden
of Proof. And so, she might discharge her obligations by saying something
along the following lines: “Because, being disposed to violence is a separate
character trait that both causes a person to play violent video games and to
commit violent acts. Persons without this special disposition, then, can play
these games without any danger of becoming violent persons themselves!”
But then, the opponent may in at least two ways convey her countercon-
siderations without wrapping them up in a counterassertion and a counter-
argument. First, she may express a counterconsideration with what Rescher
has called a “cautious assertion,” that is, a proposition of the form “P is the
case for all that you (the adversary) have shown” or “P’s being the case is
compatible with everything you’ve said (i.e., have maintained or conceded)”
(Rescher, 1977, p. 6). In our example, the opponent might, for one, state:
“As far as you’ve shown, these correlations might not be indicative of any
direct causal link at all. Being disposed to violence might be a separate
character trait and ...” Second, she can offer her counterconsiderations in
a purely questioning form: “How about P? Might P be true, in your view?”
The opponent, for one, might utter: “How about the absence of any causal
link? Could these be just correlations, not causally linked at all? What about
being disposed to violence as a separate character trait that ...” In both these
cases, I shall label such a proposition P an explanatory counterconsideration
(Van Laar and Krabbe, 2013). The function, then, of such explanatory rea-
soning is primarily to inform the proponent of her motivations for her doubt,
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and, secondarily, to give some strategic advice to the proponent about how
to go about developing a convincing argument in favour of his stance. But
the function is not, as in the case of a counterargument, to convince the
proponent to accept a contrary position.
The differences between counterconsiderations expressed with a cau-
tious assertion and those with a question are mostly superficial, for in both
cases the opponent explains her critical stance, as well as gives – albeit in
a somewhat indirect manner – strategic advice to the proponent for how to
go about his attempts to convince the opponent of his thesis. In both cases,
the proper reaction for the proponent is to refute the counterconsideration
(by showing it to be false or by showing it to be probatively insufficient or
even irrelevant) or to show that the counterconsideration is far-fetched. And
in none of them should the proponent be allowed to challenge the opponent
to offer a persuasive argument in favour of the propositions that make up her
explanation. In other words, if the counterconsideration is not wrapped up
in a counterassertion, and nevertheless the proponent challenges the propo-
sition – “What is your argument in favour of there not being any causal
link; How can you convince me?” – the proponent must be seen as having
committed a straw man fallacy, for as a matter of fact, the opponent has
in her criticism not genuinely asserted that there is no causal link. She had
merely challenged the proponent to elaborate on his position, suggesting
that the way to do so is by refuting this very counterconsideration (See
Van Laar, 2011, for a formal dialogue model that implements this idea).
Offering counterconsiderations fits the kind of persuasion dialogue that
is probatively asymmetrical (Rescher 1977) in being based on a division of
labour between a proponent – who has the task of defending his standpoint
vis-a`-vis his opponent – and an opponent – who has the task of critically
testing the standpoint and the defence offered in favoured of it. In many
dialectical models, the proponent’s task amounts to the task of showing (ar-
guing) that the opponent’s critical stance towards his thesis is untenable,
given the opponent’s propositional commitments, such as those that she has
conceded as indisputable starting points in the preliminary stage of the di-
alogue, or those that she has conceded in the course of the argumentative
exchange itself. The opposite task of the opponent’s, then, amounts to the
task of showing (explaining) that her position of not accepting the pro-
ponent’s standpoint is tenable after all, notwithstanding her propositional
commitments. With explanatory counterconsiderations, the opponent of-
fers a reasoned criticism that goes beyond a mere question and yet she
stops short of developing an argumentation of her own. In this manner,
the opponent can critically test the proponent’s position in a highly active,
5
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substantive, creative and directive manner, yet without becoming a second
proponent.2
That the opponent uses reasons to criticize the proponent’s position
should not fool us into analyzing this reasoning as itself an instance of
argumentation, at least not as argumentation in the sense of an attempt
to convince the initial proponent on the basis of what he has or should have
conceded. Different from counterargumentation, an explanatory countercon-
sideration can be fully legitimate and successful even if it is not matching,
or derivable from, propositional commitments of the proponent. As a conse-
quence, motivated doubt, made up from the expression of critical doubt and
an explanatory counterconsideration, forms a kind of criticism sui generis.
3. Considering Walton’s distinction between assumptions
and exceptions
Walton does not account for the kind of criticism where an opponent
puts forward her motivated doubt. This becomes apparent when he dis-
cusses the options for an opponent who is confronted with a proponent who
advances an argument that instantiates a particular argumentation scheme.
Further elaborating on Walton’s example, the proponent might employ the
defeasible argumentation scheme From Expert Opinion, saying: “Dr. Smith
is an expert on video games and Dr. Smith says that video games do not
lead to violence. Therefore, video games do not lead to violence” (cf. Wal-
ton, 2011, p. 143). According to Walton, a critical reaction could, first, focus
on one of the two ordinary, explicit premises, in which case, according to
the norms he proposes, the proponent should argue in favour of the at-
tacked proposition, in order to save his argument from defeat. Second, the
opponent could focus her criticism on a kind of implicitly left premise that
Walton dubs “assumption.” This is the kind of premise that is not explicitly
stated, but that is a legitimate focus of attack, such that if the opponent
challenges it by mere questioning, it is, again, up to the proponent to provide
an argument in support of the challenged proposition if he wants to save
his argument from defeat. That Dr. Smith is a knowledgeable expert would
be such an assumption in the example. Thirdly, the opponent could focus
her criticism on a different kind of implicitly left premise that Walton dubs
“exception.” In the paper at issue here, Walton gives as an example of an ex-
ception associated with arguments from expert opinion, that “[expert] E is
not trustworthy” (2011, p. 140). This example is difficult to understand as
a premise, at least in an argumentative context, given that this proposition
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does not support, but leads away from the argument’s conclusion (to wit:
whatever the expert stated). Yet, in a more recent paper, Walton gives as an
example of an exception in an argument from expert opinion “the statement
that the expert is personally reliable as a source” (2012, p. 380). Given that
this fits the notion of a premise of a supporting argument, I assume that
this illustrates his concept of exception best. (In my view, it would have
been more clear to label that proposition a “non-exception” or, even better,
a “normality premise.”)3 An exception, then, is conceived of by Walton as
the kind of proposition normally left implicit by the proponent, such that if
the opponent challenges it, the proponent does not need to provide an argu-
ment in support of this exception (normality premise), at least not before the
opponent has offered an argument that supports the opposite proposition
that the situation is exceptional, for example that expert E is not person-
ally reliable as a source. Different from attacks on ordinary premises and
assumptions, the mere challenge of an exception (normality premise), unac-
companied by supporting evidence, cannot defeat and rebut, let alone refute
the exception (normality premise). In Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008),
this norm is implemented in the rules of a formal dialogue system: If the
opponent attacks an exception premise, “Pose C” (but not when he attacks
a different kind of premise), the proponent has the option to request the
opponent to offer a counterargument, “Why not-C?” (2008, p. 386).
The upshot of the discussion in the previous section should be that
the opponent, if she has challenged an exception (normality premise) could
be seen as having also fulfilled her dialectical obligations as soon as she
has provided the proponent with an explanatory counterconsideration, and
consequently without providing the proponent with a full-fledged counterar-
gument. When challenging an exception (normality premise), she should not
be forced to put forward a persuasive argument, starting from propositions
that the proponent would be willing to subscribe to. Instead, she should
be given the freedom to explain her critical stance with a cautious assertion,
rather than with a real assertion, or with a counterconsideration in a ques-
tioning mode, thereby trying to direct the proponent to fulfil his burden of
proof in the specific way of refuting that particular counterconsideration.
Walton does not provide a criterion for determining what propositions
should count on the one hand as ordinary premises or assumptions, and
on the other hand as exceptions (normality premises). In my view (pre-
sented in Van Laar 2011), it is plausible to construe a criterion on the basis
of the concept of an explanatory counterconsideration. Suppose that the
dialogue participants have (or can be assumed to have) accepted the follow-
ing defeasible argumentation scheme: “Expert E says that P. Therefore P.”
7
Jan Albert van Laar
Then if the proponent puts forward an argument that instantiates this very
scheme – “Dr. Smith says that these games do not lead to violence. There-
fore, these games do not lead to violence” – then any proposition part of the
proponent’s argument that instantiates one of the premises of the scheme
counts as an ordinary premise or as an assumption (if left implicit). Normal-
ity premises (exceptions), then, can be connected with those counterconsid-
erations that motivate an opponent to doubt and challenge the connection
between premises and conclusion. How?
If an argument instantiates a defeasible argumentation scheme, such
as From Expert Opinion, the opponent may also challenge the connection
between the set of premises and the argument’s conclusion: “Why should
I accept that these games do not lead to violence if Dr. Smith says so?”
On the proponent’s request, the opponent should (at least if she has under-
written the argumentation scheme as prima facie acceptable) be obligated
to provide an explanatory counterconsideration, and specify it to some suf-
ficient degree: “Well, as far as you’ve shown, Dr. Smith is not personally
reliable. To be more specific about it, he might, for all you’ve shown, have
been paid by the game industry.” Now, it is up to the proponent to re-
fute the counterconsideration, and he may do so either by showing it to
be false (“Dr. Smith is reliable, and he has no financial stake, because ...”)
or by showing it to be insufficient to refute his position (“Even if he would
have been paid by the game industry, you can still take his word on it,
because ...”). The former statement, with which the proponent refutes an
explanatory counterconsideration as false, can be seen as fulfilling the same
function that Walton assigns to exceptions (normality premises). In short,
exceptions (normality premises) can be analyzed as those statements with
which the proponent denies propositions that the opponent puts forward in
explanation of why she doubts the connection between the premises and the
conclusion of the proponent’s argument.
Three concluding remarks on this issue: (1) Whether or not a proposi-
tion counts as a normality premise (exception) depends, in this view, upon
the choices made within the (possibly implicit) dialogue, especially those
by the opponent. (2) Whether or not a proposition counts as a normality
premise (exception) also depends upon the specifics of the argumentation
schemes that the participants have adopted. Suppose they accept the follow-
ing pattern: “Expert E says that P. E is personally reliable. Therefore P.”
Then, an attack such as “Is Dr. Smith personally reliable?” possibly ex-
plained by “Might he have a financial bias?” would simply count as an
attack on an ordinary premise or on an assumption. (3) By advancing such
a normality premise (exception), the proponent has started to discharge his
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burden of proof, and in a way suggested by the opponent. In line with the
dialectical division of labour, it can be expected that the opponent critically
tests the correctness of the new statement – “What would be your argument
for your view that Dr. Smith is not being paid by the game industry?” –
thus enabling the proponent to refute the counterconsideration in full.
Consequently, the notion of an explanatory counterconsideration can be
used in order to elaborate on Walton’s theory of criticism.
4. Conclusion
It hardly needs mentioning that providing the opponent with the right
to discharge her burden of criticism with explanatory counterconsiderations
brings a clear strategic advantage to her. It is much less demanding to moti-
vate doubt regarding proposition P, than to convince the proponent of not-
P. If we want to encourage opponents to act critically, and proponents to
develop responsive arguments, the importance of the notions of an explana-
tory counterconsideration and of a motivated doubt should be emphasized
in the theory of criticism.
N O T E S
1 Of course, in such a mixed dispute, the initial proponent’s burden of proof does not
evaporate.
2 Given that offering counterconsiderations can often be considered a more cooperative
way to criticize a position than merely challenging it, the opponent’s burden of criticism
should, in some situations, bring the obligation to offer explanatory counterconsidera-
tions, such as when the opponent challenges a proposition with the status of a (common)
presumption (Van Laar and Krabbe, 2013).
3 Walton (2011) labels two propositions on pages 139 and 140 as both assumptions
and as exceptions. I surmise that the labelling in the list on p. 140 is the correct one.
In addition, as just explained, I also think that the examples of exceptions (normality
premises) in this list should express that the situation is not exceptional.
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